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Overview: The adaptive success of organisms depends on being able to do the 
right thing with the right kind of thing. This is categorization. Most species can 
learn categories by direct experience (induction). Only human beings can acquire 
categories by word of mouth (instruction). Artificial-life simulations show the 
evolutionary advantage of instruction over induction; human electrophysiology 
experiments show that the two ways of acquiring categories still share some 
common features; and graph-theoretic analyses show that dictionaries consist of a 
core of more concrete words that are learned earlier, from direct experience, and 
the meanings of the rest of the dictionary can be learned from definition alone, by 
combining the core words into subject/predicate propositions with truth values. 
Language began when purposive miming became conventionalized into arbitrary 
sequences of shared category names describing and defining new categories via 
propositions. 
In the beginning was the category. A category is a kind of ‘thing’: objects, events, 
actions, properties, states. Even individuals are kinds insofar as our brains are concerned, 
because to recognize an individual, we have to detect that all the different instances of 
that individual we encounter are instances of that same individual and not another, 
despite all the variation from instance to instance. So learning that this is a dog and 
learning that this is Fido are both cases of learning a category. In both cases, there are 
instances of members and nonmembers: with ‘dog,’ there are instances of other members 
of the same category – other dogs – and instances of nonmembers, such as cats, trees and 
rocks. With ‘Fido’ there will be other instances of Fido, seen near and far, in different 
positions, moving or stationary, awake or asleep, as well as instances of things that could 
be confused with Fido, but are not Fido, such as other dogs of the same breed.    
It’s important for organisms to get their categories right so that they can do the right thing 
with the right kind of thing: eat what’s edible and not what’s toxic, approach friend but 
not foe, etc. Most of cognition is the acquisition of categories and much of adaptive 
behaviour is doing the right things with the members and the nonmembers of those 
categories (Harnad 2005). 
To be able to categorize correctly, one must be able to distinguish the members from the 
nonmembers: zebras have black and white stripes and giraffes are brown with long necks, 
but telling categories apart is not always that easy. It’s always a matter of detecting the 
features that reliably distinguish the members from the nonmembers, but sometimes 
discovering those features is hard work. For some categories, the feature detector is 
inborn, as it is with the frog’s bug-detector, and hence the hard work of detecting 
category-members was done in advance by trial-and-error evolution in the history of the 
species. Most categories, however, have to be learned through trial and error during the 
lifetime of the organism. The process sounds simple, but achieving success might take a 
long time, and require a lot of trials: the organism encounters positive and negative 
instances (i.e., members and nonmembers) of the category, tries to do the right thing with 
them (such as eat them or avoid them), makes mistakes, which are then ‘corrected’ by 
feedback from the consequences of having done the right or wrong thing with the right or 
wrong kind of thing (eating toxic things and getting sick, passing up edible things and 
getting hungry). If all goes well, the organism will eventually learn how to tell apart the 
members and the nonmembers and what to do with what. Its brain, which contains 
powerful feature learning mechanisms, will eventually detect the features that reliably 
distinguish one category from the other.   
Notice that we have not said anything yet about words or language. We tend to think of 
categories as having names (and most do), but for species other than our own, ‘doing the 
right thing with the right kind of thing’ does not mean naming it, but doing something 
more concrete and practical with it, such as eating it, or fleeing from it. Nevertheless, the 
cognitive lives of many other species consist, as our own do, in acquiring new categories, 
except that they can only acquire them by direct  trial-and-error sensorimotor experience, 
as just described, guided by the feedback from the consequences of correct and incorrect 
categorization.1 Let us call this acquiring categories by ‘sensorimotor induction’. 
Our species has another way of acquiring categories, a better way, one that is freed of the 
delays and risks of trial and error learning from direct experience. We have shown in 
artificial-life (‘a-life’) simulations that simple virtual creatures in virtual worlds which 
must learn to do the right thing with the right kind of thing in order to survive and 
reproduce are able to do so through trial and error experience, with the help of neural nets 
that are able to learn to detect the features which reliably distinguish one category from 
another. So far that’s not news. But then we showed that these creatures are out-survived 
and out-reproduced by creatures that can acquire categories in a much faster and surer 
way: through ‘hearsay’. They are ‘told’ – by learners who have already learned them – 
which features distinguish the members from the nonmembers, hence they do not have to 
go through the time-consuming and risky process of learning the category through direct 
trial and error experience (Cangelosi and Harnad 2001). But this other way – symbolic 
instruction – is not autonomous: it can’t be symbolic instruction all the way down. For 
how would you learn what the words in the instructions themselves stood for if all you 
ever heard was words? 
This is the ‘symbol grounding problem’ (Harnad 1990). The best illustration is a 
dictionary. Suppose you had to learn what Chinese words meant, but all you had was a 
Chinese/Chinese dictionary. If you did not know any Chinese at all, looking up the 
definitions of words in the Chinese/Chinese dictionary would get you nowhere. It would 
just take you on a merry-go-round, from one meaningless definition to another. But if you 
already knew the meaning of some Chinese words, then that might be enough for you to 
learn the meanings of others via the definitions alone. 
This was also how our a-life simulations had worked. In order to derive the adaptive 
advantage of hearsay over experience the creatures had to ‘ground’ some of their 
categories the old, hard way, via direct experience. But once they had done that, they 
could assign an arbitrary name to those categories, and the names could then be 
combined and recombined to ‘define’ further categories, whose descriptions could be 
conveyed to others, sparing them from having to acquire those categories the hard way.2 
That, we think, was the revolutionary advantage that language conferred on our 
ancestors: the advantage of symbolic instruction over sensorimotor induction, 
transmitting categories from those who already have them to those who do not by a 
means that has evolved in no other species. 
Our a-life simulations were just in a toy world, with a few trivial categories, some of 
them being boolean combinations of other categories. So ‘edible’ might be learned by 
induction, and ‘markable’ (i.e. location needs to be marked) might also be learned by 
induction. But then a third, higher-order category that is really just based on the 
conjunction of the features ‘edible’ and ‘markable’ might define the new composite 
category ‘returnable’ (i.e. return to this location for later eating) which would not itself 
have to be learned by trial and error in the way its two component categories were, if the 
creature were capable of learning through symbolic instruction. But a simple toy world 
and simple pairwise conjunctions do not yet show that this can scale up to full-blown 
natural language. 
We have taken it a step further, with computer analyses of digital dictionaries. We used 
an algorithm to systematically reduce a dictionary to a ‘grounding kernel’ by eliminating 
every word that could be reached by definition from a combination of other words until 
we reached a subset of the words (it turned out to be about 10% of the dictionary) for 
which there was nothing left but the merry-go-round. If you did not already know what 
those kernel words meant, then the dictionary could not help you. But if you did already 
know that 10% somehow, then you could reach all the remaining 90% via definition 
alone (Blondin-Massé et al. 2008).  
But where did the meanings of the grounding kernel come from, if not via definition? We 
hypothesized that these words were more likely to have been grounded by sensorimotor 
induction. We tested this by using the MRC psycholinguistic database to compare the 
words in the grounding kernel with the words in the rest of the dictionary in terms of their 
degree of concreteness/abstractness and their age of acquisition. The words in the 
grounding kernel turned out to be significantly more concrete (i.e. closer to the 
sensorimotor) and learned at an earlier age (Chicoisne et al. 2008). 
We have also done human psychophysiological studies comparing category acquisition 
by sensorimotor induction versus symbolic instruction and found a late positive 
component of the event-related brain potential3 that emerges during trial and error 
learning only if the subject is successful in learning the category; it is absent in those who 
fail to learn. But then when the unsuccessful learners are told in words what feature 
distinguishes the members of the category from the nonmembers, the component that 
accompanied successful induction learning appears in their brain activity too, as they are 
now able to categorize successfully using the verbal instruction, suggesting that 
instruction has produced an effect similar to that of induction (St-Louis et al. 2008).   
Clearly, both our own species and others had and have the capacity to acquire categories 
by induction. Our closest cousins, the apes and simians, also have body structure and 
motor capacities similar to our own. We are all potentially equipped, for example, to both 
observe and (thanks to our mirror neurons; see Arbib, this volume) imitate and even 
mime ‘doing the right thing with the right kind of thing’. None of this is yet linguistic, 
but it could certainly be useful. Now suppose that our species evolves a propensity 
toward this sort of nonlinguistic gestural communication,4 because of the adaptive 
benefits it confers in transmitting certain sensorimotor skills and perhaps even some help 
that it provides in the learning (by induction, not instruction) of some categories (Harnad 
2007). Only two things are missing for a transition to language (in the gestural mode): (1) 
category-names and (2) truth-value-bearing propositions. 
Prior to language, a ‘name’ is merely an arbitrary response associated with a category. If 
I first mime ‘eating’ and everyone recognizes that that gesture is associated with eating, 
then it is no longer necessary that the gesture should resemble eating in order to evoke 
that association. The ‘iconicity’ of the gesture, the resemblance that first made the 
associative link, becomes irrelevant, and the gesture can gradually become arbitrary and 
conventional, as long as everyone keeps making the association. But rote association is 
definitely not the same thing as linguistic reference. Perhaps pointing and making 
purposive gestures to evoke an association comes closer to reference, but not linguistic 
reference, for words are not just category-names. Words can also be combined and 
recombined to form propositions that define new categories – and, most important, the 
proposition can be true or false. A name, ‘X’, cannot be true or false. Only a proposition 
– ‘This is an X’ – can be true or false, and neither pointing nor naming is yet making a 
proposition; nor is purposive miming. 
I do not, in point of fact, have a compelling hypothesis about what induced the transition 
from purposive pantomime to propositions, though I can spin a plausible Just-So Story as 
well as anyone else (Harnad 2000). I would rather close by noting that once you can 
produce and understand a proposition at all, you can produce and understand any and 
every proposition (Katz 1976; Steklis & Harnad 1976). Propositions are all statements 
about category membership. (The foregoing sentence is as good an example as any!) So 
once you have made the transition from purposive pantomime to truth-valued 
propositions, you have the full power of language to define, describe and explain any 
category at all: the full power of symbolic instruction, just as long as it is grounded, like 
the kernel of our dictionaries, in sensorimotor induction. In the beginning was the 
category; with propositions came the word. 
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Notes 
1. Note that even if category learning is facilitated by watching and imitating kin or 
conspecifics who already know the category, as they are correctly categorizing, or even if 
they are deliberately pointing or miming to help us, the features distinguishing the 
members from the nonmembers must still be discovered by the brain through direct 
experience, by sampling a sufficient number of positive and negative instances, or we 
will never be able to categorize on our own. 
 
2. As will be made clearer below, the crucial thing is not the ‘naming’ itself, for that is 
merely paired association. Language begins with being able to combine a name (a 
‘subject’) with another name (a ‘predicate’) into a proposition with a truth value, 
asserting something to be the case (which is always equivalent to describing a new 
category). ‘APPLE FRUIT’ is asserting that an apple belongs in the category fruit, and 
‘CAT ON-MAT’ is asserting that the cat belongs in the category, ‘things on a mat’. We 
assume that the origin of arbitrary names is in instrumental actions and purposive miming 
associated with the category for which the action eventually becomes the name, once it is 
being used and understood as a component in a proposition intended to describe or define 
a category. Once it is being used as a component in a proposition, its resemblance to its 
referent (which is what connected the action to its referent) is no longer necessary or 
relevant, and the category names become arbitrary shared conventions. 
 
3. The event-related potential is a brain wave that can be measured at the surface of the 
scalp. The wave, about 1-2 seconds long, is a smooth series of positive and negative 
deviations, the earlier ones being more sensory and the later ones being more cognitive, 
and correlated with expectation, attention and knowledge. 
 
4. Gesture is the natural modality for first establishing a functional association between 
objects and actions, through purposive miming (including pointing), but once the gestures 
are being combined into propositions to describe new categories rather than just to mime 
objects or events, their resemblance to their referent (‘iconicity’) is no longer relevant, 
and their shape can become simpler, conventionalized and arbitrary, for speed and 
efficiency of communication in the transmission of categories. Propositional language 
having established its adaptiveness in conveying categories, the disadvantages of the 
gestural medium (speed, darkness, distance, visibility, need for free hands) and the 
advantages of the vocal medium could be discovered (perhaps as vocalizations 
accompanying manual gestures) and exploited. The vocal medium then evolves, resulting 
in a brain that is not only biased toward naming and describing categories, but toward 
doing so preferentially in the vocal modality (Steklis & Harnad 1976; Harnad 2000). 
 	  
